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AVAILABILITY OF QUI TAM ACTIONS
TO ENFORCE THE FEDERAL REFUSE ACT
In United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Go.,' the Min-
nesota Federal District Court was asked to determine whether a
private individual could maintain a qui tam action2 to recover a por-
tion of a statutory criminal penalty awarded to persons contributing
information leading to the conviction of violators of the Federal
Refuse Act of 1899. 3 The plaintiff,: alleging that defendant manu-
1. 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971).
2. 2 BouviER's LAW DICTIONARY 807 (3d ed. 1914), defines qui tam as:
an action under a statute which imposes a penalty for the doing or not doing
an act, and gives that penalty in part to whomsoever will sue for the same,
and the other part to the commonwealth, or some charitable, literary, or
other institution, and makes it recoverable by action. The plaintiff describes
himself as suing as well for the commonwealth, for example, as for himself.
See also United States v. Stocking, 87 F. 857, 861 (D. Mont. 1898); Salonen v.
Farley, 82 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D. Ky. 1949); United States ex rel. Rodriguez v.
Weekly Publications, 74 F. Supp. 763, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Grover v. Morris,
73 N.Y. 473, 478 (1878); In re Barker, 56 Vt. 14, 20 (1884).
3. The Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 413 (1970), was enacted as a por-
tion of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, Act of March 3,
1899, c. 425, §§ 13, 16, 17, 30 Stat. 1152, and provides for criminal sanctions, in
the form of fines, to be imposed upon anyone who pollutes navigable waters of
the United States. It further stipulates that a part of such fine is to be awarded
to informers contributing information leading to the conviction of the violator.
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970) in full states:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or pro-
cure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship,
barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manu-
facturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind
or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful to
deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of any kind in
any place on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tribu-
tary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed
into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or
floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or ob-
structed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to, apply to,
or prohibit the operations in connection with the improvement of navigable
waters or construction of public works, considered necessary and proper by
the United States officers supervising such improvement or public work: And
provided further, That the Secretary of the Army, whenever in the judgment
of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured
thereby, may permit the deposit of any material above mentioned in naviga-
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facturers had discharged "refuse"5 into the St. Louis River in Minne-
sota in violation of section 407 of the statute, initiated a civil suit
under the authority of section 411 to enforce the criminal provisions
of the Act.6 In their answer, defendants moved for dismissal, assert-
ing that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief
could be granted7 and lacked capacity to sue.8
The district court held that since there was no statutory authority,
express or implied, permitting a citizen informer to institute a civil
ble waters, within limits to be defined and under conditions to be prescribed
by him, provided application is made to him prior to depositing such mate-
rial; and whenever any permit is so granted the conditions thereof shall be
strictly complied with, and any violation thereof shall be unlawful.
The criminal provisions are enumerated in 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970):
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall knowingly
aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provisions of sections 407,
408, and 409 of this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500,
or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) . . . or by both such
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to
be paid to the person or persons giving information which shall lead to con-
viction.
While section 411 of the Refuse Act provides that one-half of the fine shall be
paid to the person or persons giving information which leads to conviction,
neither the statute nor cases construing it indicate specific guidelines concerning
the amount or type of information the informer must contribute in order to re-
cover. But, in United States v. Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., Criminal No. 70 Cr.
844 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 11, 1970), it was held that although the claimant did not
give all (or even the greater part of) the information on which the conviction
obtained was based, nonetheless the information rendered by the claimants, under
the circumstances, "lead [sic] to the conviction of the defendant," within the
meaning of the Act.
4. On the issue of standing, plaintiff was joined in this action by the Minne-
sota Environmental Control Citizens Association, a conservation group granted per-
mission to participate amicus curiae.
5. The term "refuse" has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court
to include almost any foreign substance or pollutant discharged into navigable
waters. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966);
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 490 (1960). See also
United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1967). For a
more detailed enumeration of specific substances includible in this definition, see
generally United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States
v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952); The President Coolidge, 101
F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939); La Merced, 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1936); Pile Driver
No. 2, 239 F. 489 (2d Cir. 1916); United States v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
311 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).




suit to recover the criminal penalty, the statute was enforceable only
by governmental prosecution. Hence, plaintiff was barred from in-
stituting his actiong and defendants' motion to dismiss was granted.
The court's holding reaffirms recent decisions in other jurisdictions
concerning the feasibility of utilizing the doctrine of qui tam to en-
force the Refuse Act.10
The plaintiff in Mattson contended that the right of an informer
to initiate litigation on his own and to use such suits to collect some
portion of a fine or forfeiture has been an integral part of Anglo-
American legal history.1 Plaintiff further asserted that the United
States Supreme Court has observed that:
9. For an in-depth treatment of the standing question in other types of environ-
mental cases, see Murphy, Environmental Law: New Legal Concepts in the Anti-
pollution Fight, 36 Mo. L. Rv. 78 (1971); Note, The Refuse Act: Its Role
Within the Scheme of Federal Water Quality Legislation, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 304
(1971).
10. See, e.g., Gerbing v. I.T.T. Rayonier, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Fla.
1971); E. B. Mitchell v. Tennero Chemicals, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1031 (D.S.C.
1971); Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695
(D. Conn.), aft'd, 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1971); Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete,
Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze
Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Enquist v. Quaker Oats Co.,
327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1971); United States, qui tam, Matthews v. Florida-
Vanderbilt Dev. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Durning v. I.T.T.
Rayonler, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Bass Anglers Sportsman's
Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 447 F.2d
1304 (5th Cir. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion
Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc.,
323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
11. Throughout English history, governmental authorities frequently relied upon
"citizen participation" to aid in enforcing the law. In Sm WiLLTA HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH L.Aw (1923), the author states:
[IN]e have seen that in the Middle Ages ... it was a common expedient to
give the public at large an interest in seeing that a statute was enforced by
giving to any member of the public the right to sue for the penalty imposed
for its breach, and allowing him to get some part of that penalty. This
expedient was . . .used by the legislature in the case of . . . statutes, old
and new, in which the public at large was encouraged to enforce obedience
to statutes by the promise of a share of the penalty imposed for disobe-
dience ...
Id. at 355-56. This situation was attributable, in part, to the lack of adequate
police forces and proper prosecutorial administration, as well as to Parliament's
uncertainty concerning the monarch's intentions to enforce the law. See 2 L.
RADZINOWIcZ, A HIsToRY OF ENGLISH CRIIiNAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
FROM 1850, at 142-47 (1957). Even during the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, as English police administration became more sophisticated, Professor Rad-
zinowicz indicates that the informer's "status as an adjunct of criminal justice was
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statutes.providing for actions by a common informer, who himself
has no interest whatever in the controversy other than that given
by statute, have been in existence . . . in this country ever since
the foundation of our Government. 12
Relying on such language, informers on various occasions have
purported to possess the requisite statutory authority to maintain
qui tam actions; and, where express statutory authority has been
found, courts have permitted such suits.13 However, an acute prob-
lem is presented where a statute, such as the Refuse Act, does not ex-
plicitly confer upon the citizen-informer the right to sue the violator
directly. Under such circumstances, the question is: may such
authority be conferred upon the informer by implication from the
provisions authorizing that one-half of the penalty is to be paid to
the informer?
In support of the view that statutes neither specifically authorizing
nor forbidding an informer to sue can be construed as permitting
such actions, plaintiffs point to the dictum of a Supreme Court
decision which would seemingly authorize such suits. In United States
so generally accepted that ... laws still continued to be enacted giving [him]
powers and privileges." Id. at 155. For a more detailed discussion of the histori-
cal development of qui tam, see Note, The History and Development of Qul Tam,
1972 WAsr. U.L.Q. 81.
12. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) has been cited by plaintiff-
informers to demonstrate that common informer statutes are certainly not foreign
to the American legal tradition. For a list of statutes concerning the subject, see
STAFF OF CONSERVATION & NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMI. OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 91St CONG., 2d SEss., Qui TAmx ACTIONS AND THE
1899 REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN LAwsUrrS AGAINST POLLUTERS OF THE NATION'S
WATERWAYS 3-4 (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as CONSERVATION & NAT-
URAL RESOURCES REPORT].
13. Substantially all of these cases turned on the presence of specific, unequivo-
cal language declaring the informer's right to initiate such judicial proceedings.
In this respect the statutes were distinguishable from the Federal Refuse Act
which contains no equivalent terminology. See generally Marvin v. Trout, 199
U.S. 212 (1905); Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336 (1805); Younts v.
Southwest Bell Tel. Co., 192 F. 200 (E.D. Ark. 1911); United States v.
Stocking, 87 F. 857 (D. Mont. 1898); Taft v. Stephens Lith. & Eng. Co., 38 F. 28
(E.D. Mo. 1899); Pollock v. Steam Boat Laura, 5 F. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1880);
Southern Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 59, 22 S.E. 809 (1895). But see
Williams v. Wells-Fargo, 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910); Rosenberg v. Union Iron
Works, 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1901); New Rochelle v. Beckwith, 268 N.Y. 315,
197 N.E. 295 (1935); Allen v. Craig, 102 Ore. 254, 201 P. 1079 (1921), where
statutory language similar to that found in the aforementioned cases (i.e., those




ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,1 Justice Black stated: "statutes providing for
a reward to informers which do not specifically either authorize or
forbid the informer to institute the action are construed to authorize
him to sue."1 5
Despite such language, when construing circumstances similar to
those present in the Mattson case, each federal district court that has
had occasion to consider the validity of Black's dictum has sharply
criticized and rejected his analysis of the law.'6 For instance, in Bass
Anglers Sportsman's Society v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc.,
17
the court indicated that Justice Black's dictum in Hess stated the law
too broadly:
The qui tam action depends entirely upon statutory authoriza-
tion, as it has never found its way into the common law. The
action arises only upon a statutory grant. The fact that someone
is entitled by statute to share in some penalty or forfeiture does
not necessarily also give such person the right to bring an orig-
inal action to recover such penalty or forfeiture. There must be
statutory authority, either express or implied, for the informer
to bring the qui tam action.'8
But, an even more perplexing problem arises where one part of a
statute expressly directs that a certain governmental official is charged
with the duty of enforcement, while another section by implication,
grants the informer a right to sue. Such was the dilemma facing the
court in Williams v. Wells-Fargo.19 There plaintiff charged that de-
fendant had established a private postal service in violation of federal
It. 317 U.S. 537 (1942), where certain federal statutes declared efforts to com-
mit a fraud upon the government a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment;
that people committing such "prohibited acts" should pay a $2,000 fine to the gov-
ernment; and that suit for the fine could be instituted by "any person" in behalf
of the goxeminent and, where successful, the litigant could retain one-half of the
judgment. 31 U.S.C. §§ 231 et seq. (1863). The Supreme Court held that the
informer was allowed to bring suit under authority of the statute, and in so finding
rejected the appellate court's opinion that the statute should be construed "with
the utmost strictness," since qui tam actions "have always been regarded with dis-
favor." 317 U.S. at 541.
15. 317 U.S. at 541 n.4, citing Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336 (1805).
16. See, e.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers,
Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F.
Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
17. 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
18. Id. at 306.
19. 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910).
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postal laws, and sought to recover the prescribed penalty of $150.20
For authority to maintain a private action, plaintiff relied on a fed-
eral statute (somewhat analogous to the Refuse Act) which provided
that any penalties imposed for postal violations were recoverable, one-
half to the informant and the other half to the federal government.21
Defendant maintained that the informer lacked the necessary author-
ity to initiate that action and, in support of that proposition, cited a
federal statute requiring that all suits for the recovery of any for-
feiture under the postal laws "shall be brought in the name of the
United States."2 2 Relying upon the principle that common informers
may not maintain qui tam actions unless there is unencumbered statu-
tory authority to do so, the Williams court held that statutory pro-
visions which required that any suits to enforce penalities under the
postal laws be brought "in the name of the United States" 28 and
which bestowed responsibility for collecting fines upon a federal
official24 outweighed any inferential authority based upon language
which could be regarded as providing authority for such action. It
was further held that section 292 of the REviSED STATUTES displayed a
legislative intent contrary to the informer's alleged right to prosecute,
and that "no other person than the United States may bring and
prosecute an action to recover the penalty,"2 despite the apparent
wording of section 4059.
While the statutory language of the Refuse Act parallels to a cer-
tain extent language found in Williams and in Rosenberg v. Union
Iron Works,26 it seems to present an even stronger argument in favor of
20. Rav. STAT. § 3982 (2d ed. 1878), provided that:
No person shall establish any private express for the conveyance of letters or
packets . . . over any post route which is or may be established by law, or
from any.., place to any other. . .place between which the mail is regu-
larly carried; and every person so offending . . . shall for each offense be
liable to a penalty of one hundred and fifty dollars.
21. Id. § 4059.
22. Id. § 919.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 292, provided: "the ...Auditor shall superintend the collection of
all debts due the Post Office Department, and all penalties and forfeitures im-
posed for any violation of the postal laws ..
25. 177 F. at 356.
26. 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1901), where a section of a statute which appeared
to authorize qui tam actions, when read in conjunction with other sections of the
statute, was qualified to require governmental action. The court found a clear




denying an informer the capacity to undertake a qui tam proceeding.
A close inspection of section 411 of the Refuse Act will reveal the
weak basis afforded informers who rely upon Justice Black's dictum
in Hess27 or the arguments set forth by plaintiff in Williams. Section
411 provides that violators of section 407
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall
be punished by a fine... or by imprisonment.., or by both...
in the discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to be paid to
the person or persons giving information which shall lead to
conviction. (Emphasis added.) 28
Thus, an informer's right to recovery in a case such as Mattson
would appear to depend upon three prerequisites: (1) a criminal
proceeding brought under section 411; (2) a conviction; and (3)
imposition of a fine as punishment for the offense. As a result, until
successful prosecution occurs, the informer's rights and interests in
recovering the reward, i.e., the right upon which he predicates his
standing to sue, are non-existent.29
The necessity of obtaining a conviction immediately suggests a col-
lateral problem facing informers who desire to recover the prescribed
reward. If the government fails to proceed against an offender, does
the informer have any right to sue for the fine himself or does section
413 operate to deny him the right to sue on his own by vesting abso-
lute responsibility for prosecution in the Justice Department? The
presence of mandatory prosecutorial provisions, similar to those
found in section 413 of the Refuse Act, have led courts to hold that
such suits may be instituted only by the appropriate governmental
authorities.30 Courts construing section 413 concurrently with sec-
tions 407 and 411 have held that the language of this section clearly
affords no opportunity for finding implied authority for an informer
to utilize qui tam since section 413 expressly requires that "the De-
partment of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings necessary to
enforce ... sections 407 [and] ... 41 1."32
Even if section 413 were not present in the legislation, it is clear
that the informer would lack standing to sue a violator directly to
27. 317 U.S. at 541 n.4.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
29. 324 F. Supp. at 306.
30. See, e.g., 324 F. Supp. at 415.
31. 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1970).
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enforce the Refuse Act, due to the terminology found in section 411.
This is so because the Act speaks not in terms usually prevalent in
statutes permitting qui tam actions. Rather, it provides for "fines"
and/or "imprisonment" upon conviction of an offense expressly char-
acterized as a "misdemeanor." 32 Such language is indicative of sanc-
tions of a criminal nature; and, prior case law has held that criminal
statutes may not be enforced by civil actions33 or by private persons.34
The Mattson and Bass Anglers courts both emphasized that "serious
constitutional problems are encountered in any attempt to impose
criminal sanctions by way of civil procedures."35
That criminal statutes are to be enforced only by the proper govern-
mental authorities is further illustrated by decisions such as Smith v.
United States-8 and United States v. Cox, 37 which held that the ex-
ecutive branch, through the Justice Department and United States
Attorneys, is responsible for enforcing federal criminal statutes and
that it has the discretionary power to determine whether or not to
prosecute. 38 As such it is immune from the interference of private
citizens. 39 When considered together, these propositions seem to sug-
32. Id. § 411.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546 (1878); United States v.
Jourden, 193 F. 986 (9th Cir. 1912).
34. See, e.g., Keenan v. McGrath, 328 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1964); Pugach v.
Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 838 (1963).
35. 327 F. Supp. at 94; Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel
Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 415 (S.D. Ala. 1971), citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391 (1938). See also Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922); United States
v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
36. 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967). See also
Spellman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930
(1969).
37. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 935 (1967).
38. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967), held that the discre-
tion of the Attorney General in deciding whether or not to prosecute or to aban-
don prosecution once it has begun is absolute. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S.
454 (1868); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 384 U.S. 906, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1966). See also Newman v.
United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Epperson v. United States, 371
F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1967); In re Grand Jury January 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662
(D. Md. 1970); Shipman v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Va. 1970);
United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
39. Such "immunity from interference" by private citizens may give rise to
questions concerning the feasibility of obtaining a writ of mandamus to force such
official actions, but a consideration of this point is beyond the scope of this article.
For a discussion of this concept, see Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir.
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gest that a private party is effectively precluded from enforcing sanc-
tions such as those provided for in section 411.
Although certain state and lower federal court cases have upheld
the right to invoke qui tam to recover a statutory penalty, without
prior governmental action, these cases can all be reconciled with
Mattson. In each case, recognition of this private right of action
appears to be confined to litigation in which the informer sought to
recover statutory rewards which were civil rather than criminal in
nature.", In no instance have informers been given implied authority
to utilize qui tam to collect exactions of a criminal nature.41
In addition to the arguments predicated upon legal technicalities,
there exists an overriding public policy question. The utility of the
Refuse Act has been increased by the passage of numerous statutes
and the issuance of executive orders designed to help alleviate the
pollution problem.42 While it is apparent that the Refuse Act is a
"broad charter of authority" as well as a potentially "powerful legal
tool for preventing the pollution of all navigable waters," 43 pro-
ponents of the qui tam approach have suggested that the federal
government does not intend to fulfill its obligation to "vigorously"
enforce the statute against polluters. This, they say, is evidenced by
1970); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965). In Cox the court held that neither courts
nor private citizens may interfere with the free exercise of discretionary power by
the Attorney General in his consideration, investigation and prosecution of crim-
inal offenses. See also Comment, Qui Tam Actions Against Polluters of Navigable
Waters: An Attempted Augmentation of Refuse Act Enforcement, 3 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 278, 289 (1971).
40. In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1942), the United
States Supreme Court sustained a qui tam action pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 231,
(1863), which provided for a civil forfeiture in cases of fraud perpetrated upon
the government. In Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905), the Supreme Court
permitted a qui tam suit by informers to collect forfeitures under state statutes
which unequivocally provided that a qui tam suit was a civil action and that pen-
alties specified therein were in the nature of civil exactions. See also Adams, qui
tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336 (1805); United States ex rel. Pressprich & Son Co. v.
James W. Elwell & Co., 250 F. 939 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 564 (1918);
United States v. Laescki, 29 F. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1887).
41. Qui tam actions have been permitted to enforce criminal sanctions only
where the statute expressly provided that such suits by the informer were author-
ized. See, e.g., United States v. Griswold, 26 F. Cas. 42 (No. 15,266) (D. Ore.
1877).
42. Some of these statutes and executive orders are listed in CONSE RVATION &
NATURAL RESOURCEs REPoRT at 10.
43. Murphy, supra note 9, at 102.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
the restrictive enforcement policy of the Justice Department.4' And
it was under such circumstances, they argue, that historically the qui
tam action has been utilized to provide a means of enforcement in the
public interest 45 Finally, they reason that making the offender sub-
ject to direct action by environmental protection organizations and
private citizens (stimulated by the hope of reward) will help insure
against laxity of public officials in enforcing the legislation.
While such actions may serve some useful functions, certain inher-
ent disadvantages accompany the substitution of the whims of private
parties for the experienced judgment of the United States Attorney
and the Department of Justice.- To permit the informer to impose
a criminal penalty upon a violator of the Act would be comparable
to compelling the Justice Department to prosecute even if, in its
judgment, such proceedings appear to be unwarranted. Such an in-
cursion upon the prosecutor's discretion would be incompatible with
the orderly functioning of our criminal laws. Allowing the private in-
former to initiate his suit regardless of the government's decision
would put courts in the awkward position of being forced to deter-
mine priorities between a criminal prosecution by the United States
and a civil suit by an informer.
In construing the prior case law as a whole, one would have to
conclude that the courts have demanded more in the nature of ex-
press statutory language than is found in the Refuse Act in order to
44. Details of this allegedly restrictive enforcement policy are discussed in CON-
S RVATION & NATURAL RESOURCES REPoRT at 10.
45. Supra note 11.
46. That such a situation was also recognized as a problem under the English
experience with qui tam is evidenced by the writings of various English historians
who indicate that as England more fully developed its law enforcement agencies
the common informer procedure became discredited. In 4 Sm WixLLLi HoLs-
wORTH, supra note 11, the author indicates:
But it was an expedient which was open to many obvious abuses. Old statutes
which had been forgotten were unearthed and used as means to gratify ill-
will. Litigation was stirred up simply in order that the informer might com-
pound for a sum of money. Threats to sue were easy means of levying black-
mail .... Further, it was resolved, "that it is inconvenient that the forfeiture
upon penal laws or others of like nature should be granted to any before the
same be received or vested in His Majesty by due and lawful proceedings;
for that in our experience it maketh to the more violent and undue proceed-
ings against the subject, to the scandal of justice and the offence of many."
Id. at 359. See also 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 11, at 139. As a result, the use
of common informer actions ultimately ended with Parliament's repeal of all stat-
utes permitting such actions, by its enactment of the Common Informers Act, 14
& 15 Geo. 6, c. 39 (1951).
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permit a private citizen's qui tam action. Although some informers
have collected portions of penalties imposed upon violators of the
statute, until recently, few qui tam suits have been brought47, and as
yet, none have been successful. 48 Thus, Mattson represents another
case in a growing series of abortive attempts at maintaining a qui tam
action under the Federal Refuse Act.4 9
Jack A. Ginsberg
47. Prior to Mattson, four qui tam suits, initiated under authority of the Refuse
Act, were unsuccessful. See, e.g., Durning v. I.T.T. Rayonier, Inc. 325 F. Supp.
446 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. United States Steel
Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala.) aff'd, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971); Bass
Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp.
302 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.
Wis. 1971).
48. Subsequent to Mattson, six additional attempts at maintaining qui tam ac-
tions were initiated, but failed due to plaintiff's lack of standing: Gerbing v.
I.T.T. Rayonier, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Connecticut Action
Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 457 F.2d
81 (2d Cir. 1971); Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323
(D. Colo. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Enqust v. Quaker Oats Co., 327 F. Supp. 347
(D. Neb. 1971); Matthews v. Florida-Vanderbilt, 326 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla.
1971).
49. A bill providing statutory authority for an informer's right to sue was re-
cently introduced in the House of Representatives. H.R. Rxs. 8355, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), which would amend the 1899 Refuse Act, was sponsored by
Congressmen Harrington (D-Mass.) and Koch (D-N.Y.) on May 12, 1971. The
bill would amend section 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§
411-12 (1964), to read:
If the United States Attorney does not within 60 days after receiving from
any person information concerning the violation, institute and maintain a
civil or criminal action against such violator, the person furnishing such in-
formation may institute a civil action for such pecuniary penalty against any
person subject to said penalty. (Emphasis added.)
Also provided is an increase in the minimum and maximum amounts of the
penalty as well as stipulations making it clear that one who contributes informa-
tion leading to the penal exactions would be entitled to and receive one-half of
the pecuniary penalty imposed on the violator.
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